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This paper deals with the construction of a discrete population mathematical model for the short-term forecast until January 2016
of the electoral support of extreme ideology parties in Spain. Firstly, the nontrivial concept of extreme ideology is stated. Then,
the electoral register is split in three subpopulations: supporters of extremist parties, abstentions/blank voters, and supporters
of establishment parties. The model takes into account the following variables: economy measured throughout the Spanish
unemployment rate; demography quantified in terms of birth and death rates and emigration; sociopolitical situation measured by
the Spanish poverty indicator, trust on theGovernment labor indicator (GLI), and the indicator of political trust. By considering the
dynamic subpopulations transits built throughout data obtained from public and private prestigious institutions and sociopolitical
analysis, a system of difference equations models the electoral population behavior in Spain allowing us to compute the expected
electoral support in the time horizon of January 2016. Sensitivity analysis versus uncertain parameters is performed in order to
improve the reliability of the model results.
1. Introduction
It is difficult to believe that Europe could perform its eco-
nomic recovery if previously it does not achieve confidence
in its political system. The depth and length of the European
economic crisis with high levels of unemployment (mainly
youth), public debt, increasing taxation, and welfare deteri-
oration combined with a lack of solutions by Government
parties as well as the so called “cartelization” of the polit-
ical parties are producing the emergence of political offers
breaking the limits of traditional European trends. Thus, the
populist and extremist political offers are not infrequent at
the present times [1], and the Government parties are losing
their power by each election period since 2008.
Literature is abundant in studies focused on the use of
surveys or previous election’s results applying purely statistic
analysis and techniques [2]. However, these approaches are
not reliable in the current situation previously described
due to the radical changes produced in the behavior of the
European citizens and governments by the hard economic
crisis.
In this paper, we propose a population discrete mathe-
maticalmodel represented by a systemof difference equations
to forecast in the short-term horizon of 2015 the electoral
support of establishment and extremist parties as well as
the level of abstention and blank voters. In fact the present
situation in Spain is very special due to the combination of
the economic and institutional crisis [3–6].
The study of the propagation of the extremist vote may be
useful to recommendmeasures to prevent the risk of political
instability by the implementation of political and economical
alternatives focused on curbing the electoral propagation of
extreme ideologies.
For the sake of accuracy and reliability, the period of study
is split into quarters of year. Our approach splits the Spanish
register of voters into three subpopulations.
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The aim of this paper is the construction of a mathemat-
ical model for short-term (next national elections) forecast
of the electoral support of Spanish citizenship up to 2015.
Individual behavior may be erratic, but aggregate behavior is
often quite predictable [7]. Our approach is epidemiological
dealing with populations instead of individuals. The foun-
dations of such approach are based on the mimetic human
behavior [8], human herding [9], and social contagion [10].
The register of voters is split into three categories or sub-
populations.The three relevant subpopulations are explained
below.
(1) The extremist voters (EX) are identified as followers
of any of these three alternatives.
(i) Breakers of the constitutional order (separa-
tists).
(ii) Breakers of the capitalist system.
(iii) Those who are disrespectful of the human rights
(racists of gender, race, minorities. . .).
(2) The second subpopulation is called abstentions (AB)
composed of those potential electors who do not vote
or plan to vote [11].
(3) In addition, the establishment voters (ES) composed
of those citizens planning of vote for a nonextremist
party that also achieved representation on the Spanish
parliament for at least the last three national elections.
It is important to point out that these definitions depend
on the type of election we are managing. In fact, nowadays
there are political parties in Spain like Converge`ncia i Unio´
(CiU) that play the role of extremists (EX) in the national
elections, while in the Autonomous Community elections
CiU and others they play the role of establishment parties
(ES). This occurs because of the recent strategy of separatism
developed by CiU. However, in this study we only focus on
national elections.
It is worthy to remark that unlike what happens in
Spain, in many European countries the extremist parties are
represented by racist ideology parties [1].
It is important to point out that we use electoral data
coming from the last three Spanish general elections (2004,
2008, and 2011) in order to know the initial level of each
subpopulation. Then, we will study the dynamic subpop-
ulations’ transits taking into account economic (Spanish
unemployment rate), demographic (birth rate, death rate,
and emigration), and socio-political (corruption indicator,
poverty index, and the trust Government’s labor indicator)
factors. Thus, solving the difference equation system, the
amount of supporters of each subpopulation is quantified.
This type of population approach has been recently
employed in the study of sociological problems such as
anxiolytic consumption dependency [12], workaholism [13],
and compulsive shopping behavior [14].
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with
mathematical model construction with an explicit compu-
tation of the subpopulations coefficients transits. Results
and simulations are included in Section 3. Section 4 shows
the robustness of the model throughout changes in the
Government labor indicator (GLI) and also the political trust
indicator. Finally, conclusions and recommendations section
is included.
2. Model Construction
This section embraces the description of the population
of study, then the sources of information and hypotheses
employed and the modeling of the dynamic subpopulations
transits.
The target population is composed of the Spanish citizens
older than 18 years old. The total amount of the population is
affected by demographic factors such as emigration, immi-
gration, and birth and death rates.
We are building a discrete dynamic epidemiological
model whose subpopulations are quarterly estimated. This
way, we start forecasting the citizenship vote intention in
Spanish national elections. Our period of study starts in
January 2012 and ends at January 2016, splitted it into
quarters.
Our starting hypothesis is that subpopulations change
dynamically and these variations depend mainly of demo-
graphic factors (emigration, birth and death rates), economic
ones (unemployment rate, poverty indicator), and socio-
logical trends (Government and political trust indicators).
The transit between subpopulations (ES, AB, and EX) is
modeled by dynamic coefficients built on data provided by
direct sources of information such as the Spanish Institute
of Statistics (INE) [15], Center of Sociological Research
(CIS) [16], the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) [17], Societe´ Ge´ne´rale Bank (SGB)
[18], and International Monetary Fund (IMF) [19] combined
with our hypotheses and analysis.
The financial and economic crisis started at the end of
2007 resulted in social and demographic changes. Due to the
breakdown of the economic trend, we only take into account
the national data of 2004, 2008 and 2011, since previous data
does not provide evidence of this trend change.
The Spanish economic framework is characterized by
high level of stable unemployment rates (above 20%).
Although we should distinguish between ideologized and
non ideologized voters, in the present economic recession
we assume that nonideologized ES voters transit to AB after
becoming unemployed.Thismeans that if the unemployment
increases in 1% then 0.01 ES(𝑛) people will transit to the sub-
population AB(𝑛). By the same reason if the unemployment
decreases in 1%, then 0.01 AB(𝑛) would transit to ES(𝑛).Thus,
we are dealing with a type of citizens whose vote support
is mainly dependent on the economy measured in terms of
unemployment.
This approach is conservative in the sense that the new
unemployed people could impact the electoral behavioral of
his/her close neighborhood, for instance the family.
Thus, the transit between subpopulations ES(𝑛) and
AB(𝑛) follows the rule:
𝛼
1
(𝑛) = {
0.01 (𝛾 (𝑛) − 𝛾 (𝑛 − 1)) , 𝛾 (𝑛) ̸= 𝛾 (𝑛 − 1)
0.01, 𝛾 (𝑛) = 𝛾 (𝑛 − 1)
} ,
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𝛼
1
(𝑛) = unemployment economic transit
effect between quarters 𝑛 and 𝑛 + 1,
𝛾 (𝑛) = unemployment rate at quarter 𝑛 (%) .
(1)
A proportion of ideologized voters who used to vote for
the establishment parties in the recent past change their vote
due to their lack of political trust due to the continuous
emergence of corruption cases combined with the increase of
taxes and the deterioration of the welfare system.The Spanish
political trust indicator performed quarterly by [16] calibrates
this lack of political trust. These voters punish the ES parties
by moving from ES(𝑛) to EX(𝑛 + 1) at 𝑛 + 1 quarter. Thus, we
have the transit coefficient:
𝛼2 (𝑛) = 𝐶 (𝛽 (𝑛) − 𝛽 (𝑛 − 1)) , (2)
where 𝛽(𝑛) is the value of the political trust indicator at
quarter 𝑛.
The approximation of this proportion 𝐶 that is regarded
as a sociological constant is adjusted bymatching the electoral
data of the last three Spanish general elections. After match-
ing the data it turns out that 𝐶 = 0.00299.
As we commented previously, Spanish population is
suffering from the consequences of long-termunemployment
rate. A proportion of long-term unemployed citizens orient
their vote intention towards extremist parties looking for
possible solutions outside the ESparties.Thenon-ideologized
citizen is affected by the principle of the continuity of transit
which means moving from AB to EX instead of from ES to
EX.
The proportion of population transiting from AB to EX
is measured throughout the Spanish poverty indicator [20].
Analyzing the behavior of this indicator for the last 4 years
(2008–2011) and assuming that this remains stable until 2015
(because the Spanish economy is not going to improve in an
important degree), we found that this quarter rate is about
0.5% of the AB subpopulation.
Thus, the rate of radicalization due to Spanish poverty
indicator is denoted by 𝛼
3
(𝑛) = 𝛼
3
.
Finally, we consider the supporters of the Government
parties to become disappointed with the labor of the Govern-
ment changing their vote intention from ES to AB. This may
occurs due to two main reasons: the lack of Government’s
commitment with the electoral program and the weakness of
Government’s reaction to corruption scandals [21–23].
The coefficient 𝛼
4
is expressed as follows:
𝛼
4
= 0.329 (𝑓 (𝑛 − 1) − 𝑓 (𝑛)) ,
𝑓 (𝑛) = is defined as the Government’s
labor indicator at quarter 𝑛.
(3)
This indicator is estimated quarterly by [16].
The constant factor 0.329 (32.9%) means the proportion
of susceptible ES voters that can move to other subpopu-
lations due to the lack of confidence in Government. That
is, about 67.1% of ES voters remain loyal to the previous ES
voting intention. This percentage includes a proportion of
the retired people among the age interval of (60–75) who are
afraid of losing their pensions, also a proportion of public
servants, clergy, military, the socialist labor union (UGT
members), and ES political parties’ members.
This factor 0.329 has been adjusted by using electoral
data from the general elections of 2004, 2008, and 2011. The
sociological factor 0.329 is assumed constant in the short
period of study (January 2016) reflecting the level of loyalty
from different population segments to the ES parties. The
data of 𝑓(𝑛) are provided by [16] until July 2013. From this
time until the end of our period of study (January 2016), we
assume that 𝑓(𝑛) goes slightly down due to the continuous
diffusion of corruption cases of the two main Spanish ES
parties (PSOE and PP), also a persistent application of new
taxes combined with the welfare system deterioration, and
finally, the demographic factors composed of the birth and
death rates and the new effect of Spanish emigrating abroad
seeking for a job.
𝛼
𝑏
(𝑛 − 72) is the birth rate of the Spanish population at
quarter (𝑛−72). This parameter is estimated according to the
data coming from [15]. We assume that all Spanish citizens
becoming 18-year-old entry into the system are distributed
equally among the three subpopulations. Thus,
𝐵 (𝑛 − 72)
3
=
𝛼
𝑏
(𝑛 − 72) 𝑃 (𝑛 − 72)
3
,
(4)
where 𝐵(𝑛 − 72) is the number of births at quarter (𝑛 − 72)
and 𝑃(𝑛 − 72) is the Spanish population at quarter (𝑛 − 72).
Then, the exit from the system could happen due to two
reasons, the biological death measured throughout the death
rate (𝛼
𝑑
(𝑛)) at quarter 𝑛, uniformly quarterly distributed.This
parameter is estimated throughout data provided by [15]. We
assume that this rate remains constant for the period from
2013 until 2015. Consider the following:
𝐷 (𝑛)
3
= 𝛼
𝑑
(𝑛)
𝑃 (𝑛)
3
.
(5)
The second reason for exiting the model is the Spanish
emigration effect due to the lack of jobs in the Spanishmarket.
The Spanish emigration number is about 200,000 people per
year. We assume that the amount of Spanish people leaving
Spain (𝐸 = 150, 000) remains constant due to the economic
crisis until January 2016.
We assume that this exit amount occurs equally from ES
and AB subpopulations, and even when they have the right to
vote (remotely) we assume they do not.
In further section, we will study the robustness of the
model under the change of values of indicator 𝑓(𝑛) for the
period of 2013–2016.
The above analysis is mathematically written by the
following equations and also illustrated in Figure 1:
ES (𝑛) = ES (𝑛 − 1) − 𝛼
1
(𝑛)ES (𝑛 − 1) − 𝛼
4
(𝑛)ES (𝑛 − 1)
− 𝛼
2
(𝑛)ES (𝑛 − 1) + 1
3
𝐵 (𝑛 − 72) −
1
3
𝐷 (𝑛) −
1
2
𝐸,
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AB (𝑛) = AB (𝑛 − 1) + 𝛼
1
(𝑛)ES (𝑛 − 1) + 𝛼
4
(𝑛)ES (𝑛 − 1)
− 𝛼
3
AB (𝑛 − 1) + 1
3
𝐵 (𝑛 − 72) −
1
3
𝐷 (𝑛) −
1
2
𝐸,
EX (𝑛) = EX (𝑛 − 1) + 𝛼
2
(𝑛)ES (𝑛 − 1) + 𝛼
3
AB (𝑛 − 1)
+
1
3
𝐵 (𝑛 − 72) −
1
3
𝐷 (𝑛) .
(6)
3. Results and Simulations
This section deals with quantification and simulation of the
subpopulation sizes throughout the period of study.
As we mentioned above, we are considering the Spanish
unemployment rate and the trust on the Government labor
indicator.These indicators have relevance in the construction
of the dynamic subpopulations’ transits coefficients. It is clear
that for the short-term future period (2013–2016), we should
assume an estimation of these indicators.
Related to the economic one, there are some prestigious
institutions forecasting these values. Thus, we built one
pessimistic scenario based on [17] (for 2013, 2014) and on
[18] for 2015, While the optimistic scenario is based on [19]
forecast embracing thewhole period. As our study is split into
quarters of a year periods, we distribute uniformly by quarters
the annual variation of the Spanish unemployment rate due
to the annually of the available information (see Table 1).
On the other hand, the trust on the GLI is based on
[16] for the periods of (2008 and 2013), but also at our own
estimations for (2014 and 2016). We assume that due to the
continuous publications of corruption events connected with
the two main parties (PSOE and PP), this indicator evolves
worsening until the end of the period of study (January 2016).
The information about this indicator is provided quarterly
(see Table 2).
Following, the values of the transits’ coefficients of the
model are expressed quarterly (see Table 3).
Computing the subpopulations ES(𝑛), AB(𝑛), and EX(𝑛),
starting from the initial subpopulations at January 2012, using
the difference system (6) one can estimate the values collected
in Table 4.
We assume that the vote intention for January 2012 is the
electoral results at November 2011.
As Table 4 shows and Figure 2 illustrates, at the end
of the period of study, January 2016, the expected electoral
support of ES parties achieves 47.71% in the pessimistic case,
while in the optimistic one the ES electoral support amounts
to 49.78%. With respect to the extremist support (EX) it
is 16.95% for the optimistic scenario and 17.62% for the
pessimistic one. Finally with respect to the abstentions (AB)
it is 33.27% in the optimistic scenario while 34.67% in the
pessimistic one.
4. Robustness of the Model
As the main goal of the paper is the short-term forecast of
the electoral support of the three involved subpopulations, it
Table 1: Spanish unemployment rate (%).
Pessimistic Optimistic
2011 21.7 21.7
2012 25.0 25.0
2013 27 27.0
2014 28.1 26.0
2015 30.0 24.7
Table 2: Trust on the Spanish Government labor indicator (GLI),
𝛽(𝑛), (%).
𝛽(𝑛) Optimist 𝛽(𝑛) Pessimist
Oct-11 33.50 33.50
Jan-12 42.70 42.70
Apr-12 37.50 37.50
Jul-12 32.90 32.90
Oct-12 27.70 27.70
Jan-13 29.30 26.25
Apr-13 27.20 25.75
Jul-13 26.55 25.25
Oct-13 25.90 24.75
Jan-14 25.25 24.25
Apr-14 25.00 23.75
Jul-14 24.75 23.25
Oct-14 24.50 22.75
Jan-15 24.25 22.25
Apr-15 24.13 22.00
Jul-15 24.00 21.75
Oct-15 23.88 21.50
Jan-16 23.75 21.25
is necessary to assume the values of the trust on the GLI and
the political trust indicator. Thus, it is convenient to analyze
the sensitivity of the model results under changes in assumed
values of these indicators.
4.1. Robustness of the Model versus the Trust on the Gov-
ernment Indicator. Due to the constant political cases of
corruption affecting the two main parties, the trust on the
Government indicator is assumed to decrease. However for
the time horizon of our study we analyzed the sensitivity of
our model under changes in this indicator values among the
interval [−0.5, 0.25]. As a result the subpopulations at year
2016 are estimated for the different values of the trust on the
Government labor indicator (see Figure 3).
4.2. Robustness of the Model versus Political Trust Indicator.
The coefficient that explains the transit from ES to EX due to
the political trust is built by the expression 𝛼
2
(𝑛) = 𝐶(𝛽(𝑛) −
𝛽(𝑛−1)), where𝛽(𝑛) is the value of the political trust indicator
at quarter 𝑛 and 𝐶 is a sociological constant that is adjusted
taking into account the electoral data of the last three Spanish
general elections.
In order to improve the reliability of the results of
the model and as the estimations of this constant 𝐶 are
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1
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Figure 1: Block diagram system.
Table 3: Subpopulations’ transits.
Quarter Optimistic scenario Pessimistic scenario
𝛼
1
(𝑛) 𝛼
2
(𝑛) 𝛼
3
𝛼
4
(𝑛) 𝛼
1
(𝑛) 𝛼
2
(𝑛) 𝛼
3
𝛼
4
(𝑛)
Jan-12 0.008 −0.02751 0.005 −0.017931 0.008 −0.02751 0.005 −0.016
Apr-12 0.004 0.01555 0.005 −0.017931 0.005 0.01555 0.005 −0.016
Jul-12 0.004 0.01375 0.005 0.013489 0.005 0.01375 0.005 0.012
Oct-12 0.004 0.01555 0.005 0.02303 0.005 0.01555 0.005 0.02
Jan-13 0.004 −0.00478 0.005 −0.003619 0.005 0.00434 0.005 −0.003
Apr-13 −0.001 0.00628 0.005 0.005593 0 0.0015 0.005 0.005
Jul-13 −0.001 0.00194 0.005 0.007896 0 0.0015 0.005 0.007
Oct-13 −0.001 0.00194 0.005 0.001645 0 0.0015 0.005 0.001
Jan-14 −0.002 0.00194 0.005 0.001645 0 0.0015 0.005 0.001
Apr-14 −0.001 0.00075 0.005 0.001645 −0.001 0.0015 0.005 0.001
Jul-14 −0.001 0.00075 0.005 0.001645 −0.001 0.0015 0.005 0.001
Oct-14 −0.001 0.00075 0.005 0.001645 −0.001 0.0015 0.005 0.001
Jan-15 −0.001 0.00075 0.005 0.001645 −0.001 0.0015 0.005 0.001
Apr-15 −0.001 0.00037 0.005 0.001645 0.007 0.00075 0.005 0.001
Jul-15 −0.001 0.00037 0.005 0.001645 0.007 0.00075 0.005 0.001
Oct-15 −0.001 0.00037 0.005 0.001645 0.007 0.00075 0.005 0.001
Jan-16 −0.002 0.00037 0.005 0.001645 0.007 0.00075 0.005 0.001
approximated, it is convenient to study the sensitivity of the
model results under changes in this parameter.
As a result 𝐶 was estimated in the value interval
[1/2𝐶, 3/2𝐶], what allow us to compute the subpopulations
results at 2016 (see Figure 4).
5. Conclusions and Recommendations
From the mathematical point of view, the proposed model
could be easily replicated to study the electoral behavior
of any other country with the obvious considerations of
appropriate electoral data, socio-political-economic indica-
tors, electoral laws, [24–27] and demographic factors.
The model predicts that the support of abstentions and
blank voters, that is, the subpopulation AB, remains approx-
imately constant since the last election in November 2011
until the expected time (if general elections are not held in
advance) in spite of the coming reduction of the electoral
register of about 800,000 Spanish citizens who emigrate
looking for a job (we assume that they do not vote).
On the other hand, the predicted electoral support of the
two main parties (PP and PSOE) scarcely will achieve 40%
in the next general elections, while in the previous general
elections they got a support of 49% of the register. This
scenario includes an important increase of minor ES parties
like UPyD, Ciutadants. This situation is combined with a
highly important growth of support of extremist parties,
moving from 11% to 17.5% that in absolute terms means to be
an increase of more than 2 millions of supporters.
The previous results imply that probably it is not going
to be possible to get sufficient electoral support to constitute
a Government without extremist parties. It looks like the
only possible imagined Government coalition would involve
at least three parties, including between them one extremist
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Table 4: Forecasted subpopulations by quarters.
Quarter ES AB EX
Optimist Pessimist Optimist Pessimist Optimist Pessimist
Jan-12 19,238,081 19,238,081 11,764,115 11,764,115 3,975,684 3,975,684
Apr-2012 19,191,070 19,191,070 11,418,760 11,418,760 4,328,902 4,328,902
Jul-12 18,575,355 18,575,355 11,678,532 11,678,532 4,645,003 4,645,003
Oct-12 17,768,050 17,768,050 12,103,273 12,103,273 4,987,024 4,987,024
Jan 2013 17,805,227 17,623,338 12,005,133 12,026,023 4,956,742 5,117,742
Apr-13 17,595,761 17,489,724 11,993,195 12,023,580 5,122,528 5,198,179
Jul-13 17,423,610 17,320,809 12,020,360 12,055,407 5,210,029 5,277,783
Oct-13 17,361,189 17,248,098 11,936,752 11,989,883 5,296,712 5,356,672
Jan-14 17,298,280 17,174,964 11,852,936 11,923,981 5,382,237 5,434,508
Apr-14 17,248,253 17,119,914 11,778,890 11,841,857 5,447,243 5,512,615
Jul-14 17,199,008 17,065,668 11,705,893 11,760,845 5,512,554 5,590,941
Oct-14 17,150,543 17,012,227 11,633,942 11,680,938 5,578,174 5,669,494
Jan-15 17,102,858 16,959,588 11,563,031 11,602,133 5,644,111 5,748,279
Apr-15 17,069,824 16,783,681 11,483,534 11,659,030 5,702,907 5,813,555
Jul-15 17,036,449 16,608,988 11,404,072 11,713,840 5,760,934 5,878,626
Oct-15 17,002,733 16,435,501 11,373,139 11,766,587 5,769,698 5,943,482
Jan-16 16,968,678 16,263,210 11,341,868 11,817,290 5,778,069 6,008,115
Op: Optimistic scenario; Pe: Pessimistic scenario.
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Figure 2: Trend of the subpopulations (expressed in millions).
party. In some way this paper advances the end of the
hegemonic two-party system in Spain although is well known
that the Spanish electoral system favors the two party-system
[24, 26].
As results of the model show, the economic crisis favors
the shift of a part of ES voters to abstentions (AB) and from
AB to EX. Thus, all types of measures addressed to improve
the economic scenario of the country will help to stop this
trend. In our opinion, which agrees with [5], unlike the
ES
AB
EX
−0.5 −0.25 +0.25
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Figure 3: Sensitivity analysis of trust on the GLI (Millions of
predicted voters).
current measures of the Government, they are focused on a
growth of taxes and also an irrelevant reduction of the public
spending.
We mean that the cuts of the public spending should
not be only addressed to reduce the size of public servants
staff but mainly consultants are directly chosen without any
technical or professional filter by local, regional, and national
politicians (about 1,500,000 people in 2011, [5]). The current
Government is not aware that Spanish citizens are waiting for
an important reduction of the public spending related to the
job of political administrators instead of a continuous growth
of taxes and cuts of the welfare system.
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Figure 4: Sensitivity analysis of the political trust indicator (Mil-
lions of predicted voters).
Apart from these issues, the lack of compliance of the
electoral programs has an influence on the shift of ES voters
(supporting the Government) to the abstentions (AB), and
also the ES voters may punish the Government by voting for
extremist parties.
In order to reduce the progressive political and institu-
tional disappointment of Spanish citizens, it is clear thatmea-
sures preventing the political corruption, political privileges,
and excesses as well as an improvement of the transparency
of public activity are necessary and urgent. Just to quote some
of them, we have a reform of the constitution, stabilizing
the political territorial administration (against the separatist
stresses), the elimination of the public financial support
to labor unions and firm associations, new formulas of
management for expensive public services. What is also
urgent is a reform of the current political parties law to
improve the transparency of the political system as well as a
change of the electoral law that punishes the appearance of
new emergent political offers [4, 6, 28].
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